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1 Introduction
One of the goals of non-cooperative game theory is to explore the means by
which one can attain efficient and cooperative outcomes in a self-enforcing
way in strategic interactions. A distinctly remarkable tool to achieve this
goal in static environments where the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept is in-
adequate is the idea of mediation through self-enforcing correlation devices
introduced by Aumann (1974). According to this idea, in strategic situations
some outcomes that cannot arise in any NE can be implemented by appropri-
ately chosen correlated recommendations of a credible mediator, forming a
correlated equilibrium (CE).1 The CE concept has been appealing as it pro-
poses a correlated randomization over the set of strategy profiles that weakly
expands the set of NE and NE payoffs.2 However, while in some games (e.g.
the Chicken, Stag-Hunt or Battle of the Sexes) the CE outcomes strictly
improve upon the NE outcomes; in others (e.g. the Matching Pennies and
the Prisoners’ Dilemma) the set of CE is equal to the set of NE.3 Moreover,
in games where the set of CE strictly expands the set of NE, there may be a
limit to achieve the total welfare maximizing efficient outcome.4
1As a matter of fact, the presence of a mediator is not always needed for correlation.
Vanderschraaf (1995) shows that in games with at least three players correlations between
the players’ subjective probability distributions over their opponents’ actions is possible
without a mediator or an external event space.
2It is also appealing because of its behavioral justifications. For instance, Aumann
(1987) shows that CE as an expression of Bayesian rationality. And, Hart and Mas-Colell
(2000) and Hart (2005) prove the connection between the set of CE and the limit behavior
of regret-based heuristics.
3Rosenthal (1974) calls that a CE is good if there is a player who prefers CE to NE for
every NE of a two-person game. He shows that a game has no good CE if it is best-response
equivalent to a two-person zero-sum game. Moulin and Vial (1978), on the other hand,
propose a class of games called “strategically zero-sum games” for which no completely
mixed NE can be improved upon. Moreover, in the infinite game setting, Liu (1996) and
Yi (1997) show that the only CE in a large class of oligopoly games are mixtures of pure
Nash equilibria. This result is extended to potential games with smooth and concave
potential functions by Neyman (1997) and Ui (2008).
4For instance, in Aumann’s example (see Example 2 in Section 3.1), the total payoff of
the players cannot exceed 20/3 in a correlated equilibrium. Even though it is more than 6
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In this paper, we examine if the set of CE can be strictly expanded
through incorporating (even arbitrarily) small costs to disobeying the rec-
ommendations of the mediator in finite normal-form games. To this aim,
we extend Aumann’s (1974) well-known solution of CE to allow for a non-
negative cost of disobedience for each player, calling the new solution costly
correlated equilibrium (CCE). Our main finding indicates that for games that
have a NE that is not pure, the set of CCE strictly expands even with an
arbitrarily small increase in the cost of disobedience (if there is room for ex-
pansion). We also study the welfare implications of exogenous cost changes
on the value of mediation. We find that socially more efficient outcomes can
be attained and the value of mediation cannot decrease with an increase in
the cost level. As these findings imply that players may find it to their in-
terests to non-cooperatively commit to non-zero cost levels subsequently, we
also introduce and briefly study a cost-selection game under mediation.
The CE is a randomization over the strategy profiles that is commonly
known by all players and implemented by the recommendations of a reliable
mediator who informs each player privately of her recommended action based
on the realization of the lottery. It is ex ante optimal for each player to fol-
low this recommendation if each player believes that the others are doing so.
However, the findings of Cason and Sharma (2007) in laboratory experiments
indicate that players do not always obey recommendations that implement
CE outcomes because of the lack of mutual knowledge of beliefs. Incorpo-
rating some small costs to disobedience to the recommendations could be
perceived as one way to induce players to sustain mutual trust for following
the recommendations of the mediator (even though the costs are not realized
in equilibrium).
It is well-known that traffic lights may be viewed as a mediator who
sends private but correlated recommendations (based on the outcome of a
commonly known lottery) to the drivers at an intersection. And, everyone
follows the recommendations believing that every other is going to do so.
(the maximal total payoff that can be obtained by a Nash equilibrium), it is short of the
total payoff of 8 that is provided by the symmetric efficient outcome.
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However, in practice, there is often a cost of not obeying to the recommen-
dations of the mediator (such as a fine of passing at a red light even though it
is self-enforcing not to do so when everyone believes that everyone follows the
recommendations). Hence, we believe that incorporating some small cost for
disobeying the recommendations of the mediator could alleviate the issues
related with players’ trust to each other in following the recommendations
and potentially expand the set of CE (and thus the NE) in the direction
to attain Pareto improving outcomes. To illustrate a second benefit of dis-
obedience costs in mediation, we may consider mediatory institutions like
government agencies or independent international bodies (such as European
Convention and Court of Human Rights) giving recommendations to all rel-
evant parties that participate in issues such as environmental agreements,
legal negotiations etc.5 The CE notion puts no sanctions or punishments
if a player chooses not to follow the recommendations and s/he would get
information about the recommendations and thus what others may do even
though s/he chooses not to follow. However, in many such contexts, there
many be tangible or intangible costs of not following the recommendations
of these agencies, and these costs seem to have been ignored by the economic
theory so far to the best of our knowledge. In this study, we would like to
capture the implications of incorporating these costs on the set of equilibrium
outcomes.
There is a growing body of literature on how to expand the set of CE,
which is essentially concerned with strengthening of the commitment of the
players to follow the recommendations of the mediator. In particular, a
“simple extension” of CE was introduced by Moulin and Vial (1978), which
was later termed as “coarse correlated equilibrium” by Young (2004) and
“weak correlated equilibrium” (WCE) by Forgo´ (2010). Like CE, the solution
of WCE also picks the outcome of the game according to a commonly known
probability distribution. The difference in WCE is that each player must first
decide to commit or not to follow the strategy recommended by the mediator
before the mediator implements the randomization and they are required to
5See Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014) for a further discussion.
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do so if they choose to commit. A player who does not commit could choose
any strategy of her own but s/he cannot receive any information about the
outcome of the lottery. Again as in CE, it is ex-ante optimal to commit
to the expected outcome of the lottery if a player believes that every other
player is doing the same. Moulin and Vial (1978) show that it is possible
to improve upon a completely mixed NE by WCE in strategically zero-sum
games where CE cannot improve upon NE.6 In a more recent study, Forgo´
(2010) proposes for finite games another generalization of CE, called soft
correlated equilibrium (SCE). He shows that neither SCE nor WCE is a
special case of the other, and in some normal-form games SCE can induce
Pareto-superior outcomes than does WCE. The only difference of the two
solutions is that in SCE players should either commit to the recommendations
of the mediator or choose some action other than the one suggested by the
mediator. Once again, it is ex-ante optimal for a player to commit to the
recommendation if everyone beliefs that every other does so. Forgo´ (2010)
shows that while WCE and CE cannot improve upon the unique NE in the
Prisoners’ Dilemma game, SCE could do so.
The experimental literature on third-party recommendations in overcom-
ing coordination problems and studying the empirical validity of CE concept
with a mediator is also blooming.7 A common feature of these studies is that
they aim to identify whether (experimental) subjects follow the recommenda-
tions and the factors which make them more or less likely to do so. They all
find that subjects tend to follow recommendations but this tendency varies
significantly with variations in the games and treatments. For instance, Ca-
6WCE is also studied in infinite strategic games e.g. Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978),
Ray and Sen Gupta (2013) and Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014). For instance, Moulin,
Ray and Sen Gupta (2014) analyze the concept of WCE in a class of symmetric two-person
games quadratic games (e.g. Cournot duopoly and the public good provision games) where
WCE can strictly improve upon NE payoffs while CE cannot.
7To the best of our knowledge, Moreno and Woorders (1998) is the first experimental
study which shows that subjects’ behavior can be explained with the coalition-proof CE
(incorporating the possibility that players could do small mistakes) when preplay commu-
nication is allowed (rather than incorporating a commonly known randomization device
whose realization is privately recommended to each subject by a mediator).
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son and Sharma (2007) find that recommendations were effective when the
subjects played against robots that always followed the recommendations,
rather than against other human subjects. They claim that the lack of mu-
tual knowledge of conjectures is why subjects fail to play the CE when facing
other human players, i.e. subjects do not want to choose the recommended
action as they believe that their opponent will not do so. Duffy and Feltovich
(2010) show that recommendations are more likely to be followed when they
induce a CE that payoff-dominates the available (mixed-strategy) NE. Bone,
Drouvelis and Ray (2012) similarly find that recommendations are typically
followed when the CE is not payoff dominated by some other outcome. How-
ever, Anbarci, Feltovich and Gurdal (2018) show that it is also necessary for
the CE either to be sufficiently payoff-equitable ex-post or for the cost of
unilaterally disobeying recommendations to be low for the recommendations
to be more effective. They examine different treatments where the equilib-
rium induced by the recommendations imply payoffs that are equal ex ante,
but unequal ex post. They find that as either payoff asymmetry increases or
the cost of disobeying an unfavorable recommendation decreases (meaning
that the loss in the payoff s/he would receive by disobeying), subjects (who
are sufficiently inequity-averse) are more likely to disobey recommendations
after the ones that ex-post unfavor them. Georgalos, Ray and Sen Gupta
(2019), on the other hand, investigates whether the subjects follow the WCE
by asking subjects to commit to a device that randomizes between three
symmetric outcomes (including the pure NE) with higher ex-ante expected
payoff than the pure NE payoff. They find that players tend to avoid com-
mitting to the device and choose to play the game by coordinating on the
pure NE. Their results also imply that the players do not like to commit to
follow the recommendations that lead to ex-post unequal payoffs.
The findings in the experimental literature points out to the need for
incentivizing players to follow the recommendations to coordinate on better
outcomes. In our paper we provide the missing incentives in the CE model by
introducing a non-negative cost of disobedience for each player, and thus gen-
eralize the notion of correlated equilibrium in normal-form games as “costly
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correlated equilibrium” (CCE). In this setup, we study how the set of CCE
is affected by increases in the cost of disobedience. We show that in case
the cost of disobedience is uniform for all players and exogenously set by the
mediator, an increase, however small, in its level expands the set of CCE if
and only if the boundary of this set contains an unpure equilibrium.
Moreover, we show that in situations where the mediator recommends a
socially optimal CCE, a sufficiently large increase in the cost of disobedience
may raise the social welfare unless the society of players is already enjoying an
outcome with the highest attainable welfare. We quantify the performance
of mediation under costly disobedience by extending the measures in Ashlagi
et al (2008). We say that the value of mediation at any cost level is equal
to the ratio between the total payoff obtained in any optimal CCE at that
cost level and the maximal total NE payoff obtained in the absence of any
mediation. Similarly, we say that the value of enforcement at any cost level
is the ratio between the total payoff obtained in any optimal CCE at that
cost level and the maximal total payoff in the game. We find that when the
cost changes the value of mediation and the value of enforcement move in
the same direction and they are always non-decreasing.
Lastly, we extend our model to a setup allowing for each player to choose
his/her cost of disobedience prior to mediation. In this setup, the mediator
first announces an optimal CCE rule that specifies a socially optimal CCE at
each possible cost profile, before the players choose their costs strategically
and non-cooperatively. This rule along with the game structure of the un-
mediated game induces for each player an expected utility function over the
set of possible cost profiles, hence a strategic-form game that we call “the
cost-selection game”. We show that there exist cost-selection games where
committing to zero (or some low levels of) cost is a strictly dominated strat-
egy for each player as well as games where this extreme strategy becomes
weakly dominant for each player.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 gives our results and Section 4 concludes.
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2 Model
We consider a normal-form (strategic-form) game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}] that
specifies the set of players N = {1, . . . , n} where n ≥ 2 and for each player
i a set of pure strategies Si and a payoff function ui : ×
n
i=1Si → ❘ giving
the von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. Let S = ×ni=1Si. For each s ∈ S
and i ∈ N , we define si such that s = (si, s−i). Similarly, we define for each
i ∈ N , the set S−i such that S = Si × S−i.
For any integer k ≥ 1 and any set X ⊆ ❘k, we denote by ∆(X) the
probability distributions over X. A correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974)
is a probability distribution p over ∆(S) such that for all i ∈ N and for all
ri, ti ∈ Si the following is satisfied:∑
s−i∈S−i
p(s−i, ri)ui(ri, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i∈S−i
p(s−i, ri)ui(ti, s−i). (1)
We use joint probabilities p(s−i, ri), instead of conditional probabilities p(s−i|
ri), therefore (1) is valid even when p(s−i|ri) is not defined for some ri and
si. Condition (1) requires that when a strategy profile r ∈ S is randomly
chosen by a mediator according to the probability distribution p and each
player i is only informed about ri and asked to play it, then no player can
obtain higher payoffs if s/he disobeys the recommendation and plays another
strategy ti instead. As shown by Aumann (1974), in finite games each Nash
equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium (with independent signals), and the
existence result for Nash equilibrium ensures the existence of a correlated
equilibrium.8
Now, suppose that disobedience to the recommendation of the media-
tor can be costly. Let c ≥ 0 denote the common cost of disobedience for
players.9 For any p ∈ ∆(S), i ∈ N , ri, ti ∈ Si, and c ≥ 0, we define the
difference between the expected payoff of a player from obeying to the rec-
8Hart and Schmeidler (1989) has a direct proof of existence based on linear duality.
9We assume a common cost of disobedience for the sake of simplicity. In general,
each player i ∈ N may bear a (possibly) distinct cost ci(ri, ti) when it deviates from a
recommended strategy ri ∈ Si to another strategy ti ∈ Si.
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ommended strategy ri and from deviating to the strategy ti, subject to the
cost of disobedience c, as follows
Di(p, c, ri, ti) =


∑
s−i∈S−i
p(s−i|ri) [ui(ri, s−i)− ui(ti, s−i) + c]
if
∑
s−i∈S−i
p(s−i|ri) > 0,
0 if
∑
s−i∈S−i
p(s−i|ri) = 0.
(2)
We say that the probability distribution p ∈ ∆(S) is a costly correlated
equilibrium (CCE) under the cost profile c if Di(p, c, ri, ti) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N
and ri, ti ∈ Si. Let P(c) denote the set of all CCE under c. Clearly P(c) ⊆
∆(S) for any c ≥ 0. We use the signs ⊂ and ⊆ for strict and weak inclusion,
respectively. Analogously, for ⊃ and ⊇.
For some of our results and discussions, we will refer to the following
definitions. Let si ∈ Si be a possible strategy of player i ∈ N . A strategy si
is strictly dominated if there exists a mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆(Si) such that for
any possible combination of the other players’ strategies, s−i ∈ Si, player i
obtains strictly lower payoff from si than from σi, i.e., ui(si, s−i) < ui(σi, s−i)
for all s−i ∈ S−i. Similarly, a strategy si is weakly dominated if there exists
a mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆(Si) such that for any possible combination of the
other players’ strategies, s−i ∈ Si, player i obtains weakly lower payoff from
si than from σi, i.e., ui(si, s−i) ≤ ui(σi, s−i) for all s−i ∈ S−i, and s/he obtains
strictly lower payoff for some s−i ∈ S−i. On the other hand, a strategy si is
strictly (weakly) dominant if any other strategy in ∆(Si) is strictly (weakly)
dominated by si.
Finally, the following definition will be helpful. A probability distribution
p is called a vertex of ∆(S) if there exists i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|} such that pi = 1
and pj = 0 for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|} \ {i}. We let V(S) denote the set of
vertices of S.
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3 Results
We will study in Section 3.1 how the set of CCE of a normal-form game
may change when the cost of disobedience increases for all players. We will
consider welfare effects in Section 3.2 and a strategic game of cost selection
(as an extension for future research) in Section 3.3.
3.1 The Effect of Cost of Disobedience on the Set of
CCE
We will first present several examples to gain some insight about when and
how the set of CCE is affected by a change in the players’ cost of disobedi-
ence. We will use these examples also to discuss our theoretical results.
Example 1. Consider the following normal-form game, known as the Match-
ing Pennies game.
H T
H 1,−1 −1, 1
T −1, 1 1,−1
Note that S1 = S2 = {H, T}, and S = {(H,H), (H,T ), (T,H), (T, T )}.
For any p ∈ ∆(S), let p = (p11, p12, p21, p22) where p11 = p((H,H)), p12 =
p((H,T )), p21 = p((T,H)), and p22 = p((T, T )). For any c ≥ 0, we can
calculate
P(c) =
{
p ∈ ∆(S) : (2 + c)p11 ≥ (2− c)p12, (2 + c)p12 ≥ (2− c)p22,
(2 + c)p22 ≥ (2− c)p21, (2 + c)p21 ≥ (2− c)p11.
}
Clearly, P(0) = {(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)}= ∂P(0). For any c > 0, we have
(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) ∈ P(c), implying P(c) ⊇ P(0). On the other hand, for
any c > 0, P(c) also contains the distribution pˆ = (p11, p12, p21, p22) such that
p11 = ap21, p12 = a
2p21, p22 = a
3p21 along with p21 = 1/(1 + a+ a
2 + a3) and
a = (2 + c)/(2− c). Apparently, P(0) does not contain pˆ. So, P(c) ⊃ P(0).
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More generally, for any c′, c′′ ≥ 0 such that c′′ > c′, one can easily check that
P(c′′) ⊃ P(c′). Moreover, for any c ≥ 2, we have P(c) = ∆(S). 
Example 1 suggests that there exist normal-form games in which any in-
crease in the costs of disobedience, however small, always expands the set of
CCE, unless this set is already as wide as ∆(S). What is most peculiar about
Example 1 is that the set of CCE, which consists of {(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)}
at the cost level c = 0, starts to contain infinitely many probability distri-
butions once the cost of disobedience is increased even infinitesimally. P(0)
does not need to be a singleton set to observe these results, which we illus-
trate in the next example.
Example 2. Consider the following normal-form game, borrowed from Au-
mann (1974).
L R
U 5, 1 0, 0
D 4, 4 1, 5
Note that S1 = {U,D}, S2 = {L,R}, and S = {(U,L), (U,R), (D,L), (D,R)}.
For any p ∈ ∆(S), let p = (p11, p12, p21, p22) where p11 = p((U,L)), p12 =
p((U,R)), p21 = p((D,L)), and p22 = p((D,R)). For any c ≥ 0, we can
calculate
P(c) =
{
p ∈ ∆(S) : (1 + c)p11 ≥ (1− c)p12, (1 + c)p22 ≥ (1− c)p21,
(1 + c)p11 ≥ (1− c)p21, (1 + c)p22 ≥ (1− c)p12.
}
Clearly, for any c > 0 the set P(c) contains P(0) as well as the distribution
pˆ = (p11, p12, p21, p22) such that p11 = p22 = (1 − c)/(3 − c), p12 = 0, and
p21 = (1+c)/(3−c), whereas pˆ /∈ P(0). So, P(c) ⊃ P(0). More generally, for
any c′, c′′ ≥ 0 such that c′′ > c′, one can check that P(c′′) ⊃ P(c′). Moreover,
for any c ≥ 1, we have P(c) = ∆(S). 
We obtain P(c) ⊃ P(0) for any c > 0, as in Example 1. On the other
hand, in Example 2 neither P(0) nor ∂P(0) is a singleton set. For instance,
11
the distributions (1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1), (1/3, 0, 1/3, 1/3) are all in P(0) and
∂P(0). What is common in both examples is that ∂P(0) contains a proba-
bility distribution that is not a vertex of ∆(S).
Example 3. We will consider a modified form of Matching Pennies game,
in which player 2 (column player) has the additional strategy of not showing
(N) its coin to the other player. If s/he chooses this new strategy, s/he pays
player 1 a penalty fee of 2. The payoff matrix of this modified game is shown
below.
H T N
H 1,−1 −1, 1 2,−2
T −1, 1 1,−1 2,−2
Note that S1 = {H, T}, S2 = {H, T,N}, and S = {(H,H), (H,T ), (T,H),
(T, T ), (N,H), (N, T )}. For any p ∈ ∆(S), let p = (p11, p12, p13, p21, p22, p23)
where p11 = p((H,H)), p12 = p((H, T )), p13 = p((H,N)), p21 = p((T,H)),
p22 = p((T, T )), and p23 = p((T,N)). For any cost c ≥ 0, we can calculate
P(c) =


p ∈ ∆(S) : (2 + c)p11 ≥ (2− c)p12, (2 + c)p12 ≥ (2− c)p22,
(2 + c)p22 ≥ (2− c)p21, (2 + c)p21 ≥ (2− c)p11,
p13 = p23 = 0.


Clearly, P(0) = {(0.25, 0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.25, 0)}, and for any c > 0 we have
P(c) ⊇ P(0). On the other hand, for any c > 0, the set P(c) also contains
the distribution pˆ = (p11, p12, p13, p21, p22, p23) such that p13 = p23 = 0, p11 =
ap21, p12 = a
2p21, p22 = a
3p21 along with p21 = 1/(1 + a + a
2 + a3) and
a = (2 + c)/(2− c). Apparently, P(0) does not contain pˆ. So, P(c) ⊃ P(0).
More generally, for any c′, c′′ ≥ 0 such that c′′ > c′, one can check that
P(c′′) ⊃ P(c′). Moreover, for any c ≥ 2, we have P(c) = ∆(S). 
In Example 3, we should note that P(0) does not contain any proba-
bility distribution that is strictly positive. This is because of the fact that
player 2 has a strictly dominated strategy (N) that is never recommended
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by the mediator, hence the outcomes (N,H) and (N,T) are never realized,
implying that p13 and p23 are always zero. The absence of a strictly positive
equilibrium in P(0), or in P(c) for any c ≥ 0, does not prevent, however,
any change in the cost of disobedience to affect the set of CCE. We should
also note that neither in Example 1 nor Example 3, any vertex of ∆(S) can
become a CCE unless the cost of disobedience is sufficiently large, i.e., c ≥ 2.
On the other hand, in Example 2, two vertices of ∆(S) (corresponding to
two pure Nash equilibria) are contained by P(0). It seems that the lack or
the presence of a vertex element in P(0) is inconsequential. Our final exam-
ple shows what happens when the unique element of P(0) (and also ∂P(0))
is a vertex of ∆(S), which implies that the only NE and CE is a pure strategy.
Example 4. Consider the following Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
Note that S1 = S2 = {C,D} and S = {(C,C), (C,D), (D,C), (D,D)}.
For any p ∈ ∆(S), let p = (p11, p12, p21, p22) where p11 = p((C,C)), p12 =
p((C,D)), p21 = p((D,C)), and p22 = p((D,D)). Given any c ≥ 0,
P(c) = {p ∈ ∆(S) : (1− c)(p11 + p12) ≤ 0 and (1− c)(p11 + p21) ≤ 0}.
It is easy to check that
P(c) =
{
{(0, 0, 0, 1)} if c < 1,
∆(S) if c ≥ 1.
Clearly, P(c) ⊃ P(0) = {(0, 0, 0, 1)} if and only if c ≥ 1. Similarly, for any
c′, c′′ ≥ 0 such that c′′ > c′, P(c′′) ⊃ P(c′) if and only if c′′ ≥ 1 > c′. 
Note in Example 4 that ∂P(0) = {(0, 0, 0, 1)} and ∂P(0) \ V(∆(S)) = ∅.
It seems that the lack of a non-vertex element in ∂P(0) (and thus in P(0))
prevents any cost change to have expansionary effects, unless it is sufficiently
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large. Notice that in Example 1-3, ∂P(0) \ V(∆(S)) 6= ∅, which implies that
the CCE with zero cost of disobedience has at least one element that is not
pure. After these observations, we are ready to present our results.
Lemma 1. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}]. For
any c′, c′′ ≥ 0 such that c′′ ≥ c, P(c′′) ⊇ P(c′).
Proof. Simply follows from (2).
Lemma 1 states that when the cost of disobedience increases, the set of
CCE weakly expands in any normal-form game. We will characterize condi-
tions under which this expansion is strict in Proposition 1 below. But, first
we need to present the following lemma that is to be used in its proof.
Lemma 2. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}]. Sup-
pose there exists c′ ≥ 0 such that P(c′) 6= ∆(S) and there exist pˆ ∈ ∂P(c′)
and Sˆ ⊆ S such that |Sˆ| > 1 and
∑
s−i∈Sˆ−i
pˆ(s′i, s−i) > 0 if and only if s
′ ∈ Sˆ.
Then, for any c′′ > c′, i ∈ N , and ri, ti ∈ Si it is true that Di(pˆ, c
′′, ri, ti) = 0
if ri ∈ Si \ Sˆi and Di(pˆ, c
′′, ri, ti) > 0 if ri ∈ Sˆi.
This lemma says that if there exists a probability distribution that is not
pure on the boundary of the equilibrium set for some cost level (when this set
is not already equal to the entire simplex), then for any higher cost level and
any player, the difference between the expected payoff received by follow-
ing the recommended strategy induced by this probability distribution (with
strictly positive weight) and choosing any other strategy is strictly positive.
This indicates that there is room for expansion under these conditions.
Proof. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}]. Suppose
that assumptions in Lemma 2 hold. Pick any c′ ≥ 0 such that P(c′) 6= ∆(S)
and pick any i ∈ N and c′′ > c. Also pick pˆ ∈ ∂P(c′) and Sˆ ⊆ S such that
|Sˆ| > 1 and
∑
s−i∈Sˆ−i
pˆ(s′i, s−i) > 0 if and only if s
′ ∈ Sˆ. Then for any ri, ti ∈
14
Si, Di(pˆ, c
′′, ri, ti) = 0 if ri ∈ Si \ Sˆi and Di(pˆ, c
′′, ri, ti) = Di(pˆ, c
′, ri, ti) +
(c′′ − c′) if ri ∈ Sˆi by (2). Also, pˆ ∈ ∂P(c
′) implies Di(pˆ, c
′, ri, ti) ≥ 0. Since
c′′ − c′ > 0, it follows that Di(pˆ, c
′′
i , ri, ti) > 0 if ri ∈ Sˆi. 
Proposition 1. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}].
Suppose there exists c′ ≥ 0 is such that P(c′) 6= ∆(S). Then, for all c′′ > c′
we have P(c′′) ⊃ P(c′) if and only if ∂P(c′) \ V(∆(S)) 6= ∅.
Before presenting the proof, we would like to note that ∂P(c′)\V(∆(S)) =
∅ implies that ∂P(c′) must be a singleton set (hence, so is P(c′)) and the
unique equilibrium in ∂P(c′) is a vertex of ∆(S), which means it is pure. To
see this, take any p, p′ ∈ ∂P(c′) such that p 6= p′. Note that the convexity of
P(c′) implies that ∂P(c′) is convex. So, 0.5p+0.5p′ ∈ ∂P(c′)\V(∆(S)), con-
tradicting that ∂P(c′) \ V(∆(S)) = ∅. This means that for any normal-form
game, the necessary and sufficient condition of Proposition 1 is violated at
any c′ ≥ 0 if and only if ∂P(c′) is a singleton set and the unique equilibrium
in ∂P(c′) is a vertex of ∆(S), i.e. there exists a unique equilibrium in pure
strategies.
Proof. We will first prove the ‘if part’. Consider any normal-form game
G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}]. Suppose that the assumptions in Proposition 1 hold.
Pick c′ ≥ 0 such that P(c′) 6= ∆(S) and pick c′′ such that c′′ > c′. Also pick
pˆ ∈ ∂P(c′) such that pˆ is not in V(∆(S)). Let Sˆ be the largest subset of S such
that for any i ∈ N we have
∑
s−i∈Sˆ−i
pˆ(s′i, s−i) > 0 if s
′ ∈ Sˆ. Clearly, pˆ(s′) = 0
if s′ ∈ S \ Sˆ. Note that Sˆ 6= ∅ since
∑
s∈S pˆ(s) = 1 and |Sˆ| > 1 since pˆ is not a
vertex of ∆(S). The facts that P(c′) and ∆(S) are convex, pˆ is in ∂P(c′), and
|Sˆ| is larger than 1 together imply that there exists p∗ ∈ ∆(S) \ P(c′) such
that for any i ∈ N , we have
∑
s−i∈Sˆ−i
p∗(s′i, s−i) > 0 if and only if s
′ ∈ Sˆ and
the set (pˆ, p∗), i.e., the interior of the arc connecting pˆ to p∗, is nonempty
and contained by ∆(S) \ P(c′). Pick such a p∗. Consider the sequences
(αk) and (qk) such that for any positive integer k, we have αk = (1/2)
k and
qk = αk p
∗ + (1 − αk) pˆ. Pick any i ∈ N and ri, ti ∈ Si. By construction,
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it is true that for every integer k ≥ 1 we have qk(s
′) = 0 if s′ ∈ S \ Sˆ and∑
s−i∈Sˆ−i
qk(s
′
i, s−i) > 0 if s
′ ∈ Sˆ. Therefore, Di(qk, c
′′, ri, ti) = 0 if ri ∈ Si\ Sˆi
and Di(qk, c
′′, ri, ti) = Di(qk, c
′, ri, ti) + (c
′′ − c′) if ri ∈ Sˆi by (2). Moreover,
limk→∞Di(qk, c
′′, ri, ti) = Di(pˆ, c
′′, ri, ti). Since c
′′ > c′ and all assumptions
in Lemma 2 are satisfied for Sˆ and pˆ, it is true that Di(pˆ, c
′′, ri, ti) = 0 if
ri ∈ S \ Sˆi and Di(pˆ, c
′′, ri, ti) > 0 if ri ∈ Sˆi. We have thus established that
limk→∞Di(qk, c
′′, ri, ti) = 0 if ri ∈ Si \ Sˆi and limk→∞Di(qk, c
′′, ri, ti) > 0
if ri ∈ Sˆi. Since Di(p, c
′′, ri, ti) is continuous in p, there exists a positive
integer ki(ri, ti) such that Di(qk, c
′′, ri, ti) > 0 for all k ≥ ki(ri, ti) if ri ∈ Sˆi.
Note that we can calculate ki(ri, ti) for any i ∈ N and ri, ti ∈ Si. Let
k¯ = maxi∈N maxri,ti∈Si ki(ri, ti). Then, for any i ∈ N and ri, ti ∈ Si it is true
that Di(qk¯, c
′′, ri, ti) > 0 if ri ∈ Sˆi and Di(qk¯, c
′′, ri, ti) = 0 if ri ∈ S \ Sˆi.
Therefore, qk¯ ∈ P(c
′′). Since qk¯ ∈ ∆(S)\P(c
′), P(c′′) 6= P(c′). Finally, since
c′′ > c′, Lemma 1 implies that P(c′′) ⊇ P(c′). Therefore, P(c′′) ⊃ P(c′),
completing the proof of the ‘if part’. Now we will prove the ‘only if part’.
First, consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}]. Suppose
that there exists c′ ≥ 0 is such that P(c′) 6= ∆(S). Also suppose for
a contradiction that ∂P(c′) \ V(∆(S)) = ∅. This means that the neces-
sary and sufficient condition of Proposition 1 is violated at any c′ ≥ 0 if
and only if ∂P(c′) is a singleton set and the unique equilibrium in ∂P(c′)
is a vertex of ∆(S). So, pick any c′ > 0 such that |∂P(c′)| = 1 and
∂P(c′) \ V(∆(S)) = ∅. Let p∗ be the unique distribution in P(c′). De-
fine for any p ∈ ∆(S) \ {p∗} and i ∈ N the set Si(p, c
′) = {(ri, ti) ∈
Si × Si :
∑
s−i∈S−i
p(ri, s−i)[ui(ri, s−i)− (ui(ti, s−i) − c
′)] < 0} and also the
set of individuals N(p, c′) = {i ∈ N : Si(p, c
′) 6= ∅} who find that (uni-
laterally) disobeying the recommendation of the mediator is strictly ben-
eficial. For any p ∈ ∆(S) \ {p∗}, we know that N(p, c′) is nonempty,
since p /∈ P(c′). Let k(c′) = maxp∈∆(S)\{p∗} maxi∈N(p,c′)max(ri,ti)∈Si(p,c′)
[ui(ri, s−i)− (ui(ti, s−i)− c
′)]. Note that k(c′) < 0 since ∆(S) \ P(c′) 6= ∅.
Pick any c′′ > 0 such that c′ < c′′ < −k(c′). It follows that i ∈ N(p, c′′) if
and only if i ∈ N(p, c′). So, for any p ∈ ∆(S) \ {p∗}, N(p, c′′) 6= ∅, implying
that P(c′′) = {p∗} = P(c′). Thus, it is not true that P(c′′) ⊃ P(c′) for all
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c′′ > c′, completing the proof of the ‘only if’ part. 
Proposition 1 states that if at any level of the cost of disobedience, c, there
is any room for the set of CCE, P(c), to expand, then an increase in c can lead
to an expansion if and only if the boundary of P(c) contains an equilibrium
that is unpure, i.e., a non-vertex element of the probability simplex ∆(S).
One can easily check that in Examples 1-3, the (necessary and) sufficient
condition of Proposition 1 is satisfied, and therefore its prediction becomes
true. On the other hand, Example 4 illustrates how this prediction fails when
the necessary (and sufficient) condition of Proposition 1 does not hold. In
that example, P(c′) 6= ∆(S) and thus there is room for P(c′) to expand only
if c′ < 1. So, consider any c′ < 1. We saw that an increase in the cost level
from c′ to c′′ can be expansionary only if c′′ ≥ 1. This implies that for any
cost increase ǫ that is smaller than 1− c′, the set of CCE is not larger when
the cost of disobedience is c′′ = c′ + ǫ than when it is c′.
Proposition 1 also indicates when costly mediation leads to a coarser set
of CCE than costless mediation does.
Corollary 1. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}]. If
P(0) 6= ∆(S) and G has a Nash equilibrium that is not a vertex of ∆(S),
then P(c) ⊃ P(0) for any c > 0.
Proof. We suppose that the normal-form gameG = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}] is such
that P(0) 6= ∆(S) and G has a Nash equilibrium σ that is in ∆(S)\V(∆(S)).
Pick any c > 0. If σ ∈ ∂P(0), then σ ∈ ∂P(0) \ V(∆(S)), and by Propo-
sition 1 we obtain P(c) ⊃ P(0). Now suppose that σ /∈ ∂P(0). Pick
any p ∈ ∂∆(S) such that p /∈ V(∆(S)). Since P(0) ⊆ ∆(S), it is true
that σ /∈ ∂∆(S), implying σ 6= p. Define q(α) = ασ + (1 − α)p for any
α ∈ (0, 1). Since P(0) is bounded and P(0) ⊆ ∆(S), there exists some
αˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that q(αˆ) ∈ ∂P(0). Also, since {σ, p} ∩ V(∆(S)) = ∅,
it is true that q(αˆ) /∈ V(∆(S)), implying q(αˆ) ∈ ∂P(0) \ V(∆(S)). Since
∂P(0) \ V(∆(S)) 6= ∅, again we have P(c) ⊃ P(0) by Proposition 1. 
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The above corollary to Proposition 1 says that if any normal-form game
has an unpure (yet, not necessarily totally mixed) Nash equilibrium, then the
set of CCE is always strictly coarser when disobedience is costly than when
it is not. If, on the other hand, a normal-form game has only one equilibrium
in pure strategies, then the set of CEE does not strictly expand unless the
cost is sufficiently high. Thus, we can say that for any finite normal-form
game that has strictly dominant strategy equilibrium or that is dominance
solvable, adding small non-zero cost to disobedience does not affect the set
of CCE. The next result shows that in any normal-form game every proba-
bility distribution becomes a CCE, as expected, when disobedience becomes
sufficiently costly.
Proposition 2. For any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}], there
exists c¯ ≥ 0 such that P(c) = ∆(S) if and only if c ≥ c¯.
Proof. Pick any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}]. Let c¯ =
maxi∈N maxri,ti∈Si maxs−i∈S−i [ui(ri, s−i)− ui(ti, s−i)]. Then, equation (2) im-
plies that for any p ∈ ∆(S), c ≥ c¯, i ∈ N , and ri, ti ∈ Si we have
Di(p, c, ri, ti) ≥ 0. Thus, P(c) = ∆(S) if c ≥ c¯. To prove the ‘only if’
part, first assume that c¯ defined above is equal to zero. Since c < 0 is not
possible, it is true that P(c) = ∆(S) only if c ≥ 0. Now, suppose c¯ > 0.
Then, pick any c ∈ [0, c¯). The definition of c¯ implies that there exist i ∈ N ,
ri, ti ∈ Si, and s−i ∈ S−i such that ui(ri, s−i) − ui(ti, s−i) + c < 0. Pick
any such i ∈ N , ri, ti ∈ Si, and s−i ∈ S−i. Let p ∈ ∆(S) be such that
p(ri, s−i) = 1 and p(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S \ {(ri, s−i)}. Then, equation (2)
implies that Di(p, c, ri, ti) = ui(ri, s−i) − ui(ti, s−i) + c < 0, implying that
p /∈ P(c). Therefore, P(c) 6= ∆(S) if c ∈ [0, c¯), completing the proof. 
Note that in Examples 1 and 3 we have P(c) = ∆(S) if c ≥ 2 and in
Examples 2 and 4 we have P(c) = ∆(S) if c ≥ 1.
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3.2 Welfare Effects
Now we will study how the social welfare in any mediated normal-form game
can be affected by the change in, as well as the presence/absence of, the cost
of disobedience. Given any disobedience cost c ≥ 0, we suppose that the
mediator has the task of implementing a CCE that maximizes the sum of
the expected utilities of all players. Since the solution to this maximization
problem may not be unique, we define the set of (socially) optimal CCE as
given by
SO(P(c)) =
{
p ∈ P(c) :
∑
i∈N
E[ui|p] ≥
∑
i∈N
E[ui|p
′] for all p′ ∈ P(c)
}
, (3)
where
E[ui|p
′] =
∑
s∈S
p′(s)ui(si, s−i). (4)
Note that all probability distributions in SO(P(c)) must lead to the same
expected utility sum for the players. For simplicity, we will denote this
sum by E[ui|SO(P(c))], by slightly abusing the notation. Also, we will use
SO(∆(S)) to denote the set of probability distributions in ∆(S) that maxi-
mize the sum of the expected utilities of all players.
Proposition 3. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}].
Pick c′, c′′ ≥ 0. It is true that
(i) if c′′ > c′, then
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′′))] ≥
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′))], and
(ii) if
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′′))] >
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′))], then c′′ > c.
Proof. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}]. To prove
part (i), pick any c′, c′′ ≥ 0 such that c′′ > c′. Lemma 1 implies P(c′′) ⊇
P(c′). Then, equations (3) and (4) imply that
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′′))] ≥∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′))]. To prove part (ii), pick any c′, c′′ ≥ 0 and assume
that
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′′))] >
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′))]. Then, it cannot be
true that SO(P(c′)) ⊇ SO(P(c′′)). It follows from equations (3) and (4)
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that P(c′) ⊇ P(c′′) cannot be true. Consequently, Lemma 1 implies that
c′ ≥ c′′ cannot be true, implying that c′′ > c, which completes the proof. 
The above proposition asserts that the total payoffs of players at an opti-
mal CCE cannot be lower whenever the cost of disobedience becomes higher
in the mediated game. Moreover, a cost change cannot increase the total
payoffs of players at an optimal CCE unless it is positive. However, whether
the total payoffs increase, when the cost of disobedience does so, depends on
the payoff structure of the game. To illustrate this point, let us first consider
the Matching Pennies Game in Example 1. Note that for any p ∈ ∆(S),
one can calculate that
∑
i∈N E[ui|p] = 0, implying SO(P(c)) = P(c) for
any c ≥ 0, i.e., any probability distribution in P(c) is optimal. Moreover,∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c))] = 0 for any c ≥ 0, implying that the optimal value
of the expected social welfare is independent from the cost of disobedience.
As another example, let us now consider the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game in
Example 4, where the payoffs are not zero-sum. We can easily calculate
SO(P(c)) for any c ≥ 0 as follows:
SO(P(c)) =
{
{(0, 0, 0, 1)} if c < 1,
{(1, 0, 0, 0)} if c ≥ 1.
Clearly, for any cost levels c and c′′ such that 1 > c′′ > c′ ≥ 0, we have∑
i∈N E[ui| SO(P(c
′′))] =
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′))] = 2. On the other hand,
for any c′ < 1, we can always find c′′ ≥ 1 such that
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′′))] =
4 > 2 =
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′))]. Note that the singleton set {(1, 0, 0, 0)}
is incidentally equal to SO(∆(S)), the set of probability distributions that
maximize the total payoffs (of two players) in ∆(S). These observations can
be generalized in the following result.
Proposition 4. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}].
Suppose c′ ≥ 0 is such that
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(∆(S))] >
∑
i∈N E[ui| SO(P(c
′))].
Then, there exists c′′ > c′ such that
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′′))] >
∑
i∈N E[ui|
SO(P(c′))].
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Proof. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}]. Sup-
pose there exists c′ ≥ 0 is such that
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(∆(S))] >
∑
i∈N E[ui|
SO(P(c′))]. Pick any such c′. Then, equations (3) and (4) imply that ∆(S) ⊃
P(c′). Proposition 2 implies that there exists some c′′ ≥ 0 such that P(c′′) =
∆(S), implying SO(P(c′′)) = SO(∆(S)). Hence,
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′′))]
>
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c
′))]. Then, Proposition 3(ii) implies that c′′ > c′, which
completes the proof. 
Proposition 4 implies that if in any normal-form game the cost of disobedi-
ence is at such a level that the total expected welfare obtained by the players
when they obey to play according to the recommendations of the mediator
implementing an optimal CCE is below the maximum total expected welfare
the players can ever obtain from this game, then the mediator can increase
the total expected welfare of the players by increasing the cost of disobedience
to a sufficiently high level. As a matter of fact, this is exactly the case in Ex-
amples 2 and 4. For instance, consider Example 2. Let p = (p11, p12, p21, p22)
for any p ∈ ∆(S). One can easily check that SO(∆(S)) = {(0, 0, 1, 0)} and∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(∆(S))] = 8. Also,
SO(P(c))] =


{(
1−c
3−c
, 0, 1+c
3−c
, 1−c
3−c
)}
if c ∈ [0, 1)
{(0, 0, 1, 0)} if c ≥ 1
and ∑
i∈N
E[ui|SO(P(c))] =


20−4c
3−c
if c ∈ [0, 1)
8 if c ≥ 1.
Note that the sum
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c))] is increasing in c over (0, 1) and
limc→1−
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(P(c))] = 8 =
∑
i∈N E[ui|SO(∆(S))]. So, for any
c′ ∈ [0, 1) and any c′′ ≥ 1 in Example 2, the claim of Proposition 4 becomes
true. What is more interesting is that this claim even becomes true for
any c′ ∈ [0, 1) and any c′′ > c′. That is, the mediator can raise the total
expected welfare of the players at an optimal CCE by increasing the cost
of disobedience even by an arbitrarily small amount as long as this cost is
sufficiently low (i.e., it is below 1).
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Example 2 reveals that there are normal-form games in which the social
benefit of mediation increases with the cost of disobedience, suggesting that
mediation in these games performs better when disobedience is more costly.
In fact, we can formally quantify the performance of mediation under costly
disobedience by extending the measures in Ashlagi et al (2008) proposed for
costless mediation. Given any normal-form game, we say that the value of
mediation, m(c), at cost level c is equal to the ratio between the total payoff
obtained in any optimal CCE at cost level c and the maximal total Nash
equilibrium payoff obtained in the absence of any mediation. Also, we say
that the value of enforcement, e(c), is the ratio between the total payoff ob-
tained in any optimal CCE at cost level c and the maximal total payoff in
the normal-form game. Given these definitions, Proposition 3 implies the
following result.
Corollary 2. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}]. Pick
c′, c′′ ≥ 0. It is true that
(i) m(c′′) ≥ m(c′) if and only if e(c′′) ≥ e(c′),
(ii) if c′′ > c′, then m(c′′) ≥ m(c′),
(iii) if m(c′′) > m(c′), then c′′ > c.
Proof. Directly follows from Proposition 3 and the definitions of m(.) and
e(.). 
Corollary 2 says that when the cost of disobedience c changes, m(c) and
e(c) always move in the same direction and they are always non-decreasing.
Whether they can be increasing at some (Lebesgue) measurable interval of
cost values depends on the structure of game. To see this, note that for
the normal-form game in Example 2, one can calculate that the value of
mediation and the value of enforcement are given by
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m(c) =


10− 2c
9− 3c
if c < 1
4
3
if c ≥ 1
and
e(c) =


5− c
6− 2c
if c < 1
1 if c ≥ 1
respectively. One may check that both m(c) and e(c) are increasing over the
interval (0, 1). In particular, we note that m(0) = 10/9 and m(c) = 12/9 for
any c ≥ 1. We note that m(c) is always above 1, implying that mediation is
always beneficial for the society. Also, we note that e(0) = 5/6, e(c) < 1 for
any c < 1, and e(c) = 1 for any c ≥ 1. The full enforcement is attained if
and only if c ≥ 1.
On the other hand, for the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game in Example 4, the
value of mediation and the value of enforcement are given by
m(c) =


1 if c < 1
2 if c ≥ 1
and
e(c) =


1
2
if c < 1
1 if c ≥ 1
respectively. We observe that both m(c) and e(c) are constant for c < 1
and c > 1 and they both jump to a higher value at c = 1. Mediation is
not beneficial (the value of mediation is not higher than 1) unless the cost
of disobedience is sufficiently large, i.e., c ≥ 1. Likewise, if c is less than 1,
mediation cannot enforce the players to any outcome that is not obtained as
a Nash equilibrium in the absence of mediation (let alone the outcome with
the maximal social welfare). Full enforcement is attained only if c ≥ 1, while
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very small changes in the value of c can increase enforcement only if it is
below, but also sufficiently close to, 1.
Clearly, there exist normal-form games (like the one in Example 2) in
which the payoff obtained by each player at an optimal CCE changes as
the cost of disobedience is varied. In these games, any rule (whether it is
optimal or not) used by the mediator to select an equilibrium from the set of
possible CCE would accordingly induce for each player a preference (or an
expected utility function) over the possible values of disobedience cost. These
preferences of players may result in strategic issues which we will investigate
in the next section.
3.3 An Extension for Future Research: Cost-Selection
Game under Mediation
Here we will introduce, and briefly study, an extension for future research.
Consider a situation where each player in the mediated game is asked, before
the game starts, to non-cooperatively select (and announce to the mediator)
the cost of disobedience that s/he has to bear in case s/he disobeys to any
recommendation made by the mediator. Suppose that before observing the
cost chosen by any player i, the mediator announces an equilibrium rule that
specifies a CCE for each possible cost profile reported by the society. Given
this rule, we assume that each player will choose his/her disobedience cost
given his/her conjectures about the choices of the others.
So, consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}] that players
face in the absence of any mediation. Let ci denote the cost of disobedience
(punishment fee) player i non-cooperatively chooses and announces to the
mediator, and let Ci = [0, c¯i] denote for each player i the set of all admis-
sible cost reports, where c¯i = maxri,ti∈Si maxs−i∈S−i [ui(ri, s−i)− ui(ti, s−i)].
Define C = ×i∈NCi, with c ∈ C denoting the cost profile for the set of all
players. As we said earlier, before the players choose their costs of disobe-
dience, the mediator announces a CCE rule f . Formally, f is a CCE rule if
f : C → ∆(S) is a function such that f(c) ∈ P(c) for all c ∈ C. Clearly,
given any CCE rule f , the utility function ui(.) of each player i over the set
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of strategies S in a given normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}] induces a
utility function uf,Gi (.) over the set of strategies C such that u
f,G
i (c) = E[ui|p]
for any c ∈ C, where p = f(c) and E[ui|p] =
∑
s∈S p(s)ui(si, s−i). Let
Gf = [N, {Ci}, {u
f,G
i (.)}] denote the cost-selection game obtained from G
under the rule f . Given a normal-form game G and a CCE rule f , we define
the best response correspondence of player i ∈ N in the cost-selection game
Gf as bfi : C−i → Ci that assigns to each profile c−i in C−i the set
bfi (c−i) = {ci ∈ Ci : u
f,G
i (ci, c−i) ≥ u
f,G
i (c
′
i, c−i) for all c
′
i ∈ Ci}.
We say that a cost profile c∗ ∈ C is a Nash equilibrium of the cost-selection
game Gf if c∗i ∈ b
f
i (c
∗
−i) for all i ∈ N . Since for each i ∈ N , the set Ci ⊂ ❘ is a
nonempty, convex, and compact subset of an Euclidean space, we know by the
works of Debreu (1952), Glicksberg (1952), and Fan (1952) that (whenever
f is single-valued) a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Gf exists if uf,Gi (c) is
continuous in c and quasiconcave in ci.
Below, we will extend the game in Example 2, borrowed from Aumann
(1974), to a cost-selection game to gain some insights.
Example 5. Consider the normal-form game in Example 2. Suppose that
players can non-cooperatively choose their costs of disobedience. For any
p ∈ ∆(S), let p = (p11, p12, p21, p22) where p11 = p((U,L)), p12 = p((U,R)),
p21 = p((D,L)), and p22 = p((D,R)). One can easily check that for any cost
profile c = (c1, c2) ∈ C, the set of CCE can be calculated as
P(c) =
{
p ∈ ∆(S) : (1 + c1)p11 ≥ (1− c1)p12, (1 + c1)p22 ≥ (1− c1)p21,
(1 + c2)p11 ≥ (1− c2)p21, (1 + c2)p22 ≥ (1− c2)p12.
}
Clearly, for any c ∈ C such that c 6= (0, 0), we have P(c) ⊃ P((0, 0)). More
generally, for any c′, c′′ ∈ [0, 1]2 such that c′′ ≥ c′ with c′′i > c
′
i for some i ∈ N ,
one can easily check that P(c′′) ⊃ P(c′).
Now, suppose that the mediator announces a CCE rule f such that f(c) ∈
SO(P(c)) for any c ∈ [0, 1]. One can easily calculate that
∑
i∈N E[Ui|p] =
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6 + 2p21 for any p ∈ ∆(S), implying that
SO(P(c))] =


{(
(1+c1)(1−c2)
3+c1+c2−c1c2
, 0, (1+c1)(1+c2)
3+c1+c2−c1c2
, (1−c1)(1+c2)
3+c1+c2−c1c2
)}
if c1, c2 ∈ [0, 1)
{(1−c2
2
, 0, 1+c2
2
, 0)} if c1 = 1 and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
{(0, 0, 1+c1
2
, 1−c1
2
)} if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 = 1
{(0, 0, 1, 0)} if c1 = 1 and c2 = 1.
Since SO(P(c)) is always a singleton set, f(c) is uniquely determined. Noting
that E[U1|p] = 5p11 + 4p21 + p22 and E[U2|p] = p11 + 4p21 + 5p22 for any
p ∈ ∆(S), one can easily calculate that
E[U1|f(c)] =


10+8c1−2c1c2
3+c1+c2−c1c2
if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
9−c2
2
if c1 = 1 and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
5+3c1
2
if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 = 1
4 if c1 = 1 and c2 = 1
and
E[U2|f(c)] =


10+8c2−2c1c2
3+c1+c2−c1c2
if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
9−c1
2
if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 = 1
5+3c2
2
if c1 = 1 and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
4 if c1 = 1 and c2 = 1.
Thus, we have constructed the cost-selection game Gf = [N, {Ci}, {u
f,G
i (.)}].
For this game, we can calculate the best-response correspondences as bf1(c2) =
{1} for any c2 ∈ C2 and b
f
2(c1) = {1} for any c1 ∈ C1. Clearly, the cost profile
(0, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium of Gf . It is true that if player j ∈ {1, 2}
chooses his/her cost at cj = 0, player i 6= j can secure an expected utility of
9/2 by choosing ci = 1. As a matter of fact, (c1, c2) is never Nash equilibrium
when c1 ∈ [0, 1) or c2 ∈ [0, 1). The unique Nash equilibrium of G
f arises at
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(c1, c2) = (1, 1), at which both players obtain an expected utility of 4. 
Example 5 reveals the following.
Remark 1. There exist cost-selection games where selecting the cost of dis-
obedience at zero level (or below some positive level) is a strictly dominated
strategy for each player. In such games, it is to the interest of each player to
voluntarily commit to pay some positive penalty fee to the mediator in case
of disobedience.
Inspecting the expected utilities in Example 5 closely, we can observe that
for each i ∈ N , E[Ui|f(c)] is strictly increasing in the own cost level ci (for
any level of the opponent’s cost cj) below some threshold. This observation
leads us to note down another simple remark below. Let 0 denote the zero
cost profile c where ci = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Remark 2. Consider any normal-form game G = [N, {Si}, {ui(.)}] and
any CCE rule f . If there exists some i ∈ N such that E[Ui|f(c)] is in-
creasing in ci around 0, then c
∗ = 0 is not a Nash equilibrium of the game
Gf = [N, {Ci}, {u
f,G
i (.)}].
The next example shows that the games in Remark 1 or Remark 2 are not
universal. There are also games where none of the players finds it beneficial
to voluntarily commit to pay positive penalty fees to the mediator in case of
disobedience.
Example 6. Suppose that the players in Example 4 can non-cooperatively
choose their costs of disobedience in the mediated game of Prisoners’ Dilemma.
For any p ∈ ∆(S), let p = (p11, p12, p21, p22) where p11 = p((C,C)), p12 =
p((C,D)), p21 = p((D,C)), and p22 = p((D,D)). For any cost profile,
c = (c1, c2) ∈ [0, 1]
2, the set of CCE can be calculated as
P(c) = {p ∈ ∆(S) : (1− c1)(p11 + p12) ≤ 0 and (1− c2)(p11 + p21) ≤ 0}.
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It is easy to see that
P(c)=


{(0, 0, 0, 1)} if c1, c2 ∈ [0, 1)
{p ∈ ∆(S) : p11 = p12 = 0, p21 + p22 = 1} if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 = 1
{p ∈ ∆(S) : p11 = p21 = 0, p12 + p22 = 1} if c1 = 1 and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
∆(S) if c1 = 1 and c2 = 1.
Suppose that the mediator announces, before s/he observes the cost report
of players, a CCE rule f such that f(c) ∈ SO(P(c)) for any c ∈ [0, 1]2. One
can easily check that
∑
i∈N E[Ui|p] = 4p11+3p12+3p21+2p22 = 3+p11−p22
for any p ∈ ∆(S), implying that
SO(P(c)) =


{(0, 0, 0, 1)} if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
{(0, 0, 1, 0)} if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 = 1
{(0, 1, 0, 0)} if c1 = 1 and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
{(1, 0, 0, 0)} if c1 = 1 and c2 = 1.
Since SO(P(c)) is always a singleton set, f(c) is uniquely determined. Noting
that E[U1|p] = 2p11 + 3p21 + p22 and E[U2|p] = 2p11 + 3p12 + p22 for any
p ∈ ∆(S), one can easily calculate that
E[U1|f(c)] =


1 if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
3 if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 = 1
0 if c1 = 1 and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
2 if c1 = 1 and c2 = 1
and
E[U2|f(c)] =


1 if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
0 if c1 ∈ [0, 1) and c2 = 1
3 if c1 = 1 and c2 ∈ [0, 1)
2 if c1 = 1 and c2 = 1.
Thus, we have constructed the extended game Gf = [N, {Ci}, {u
f,G
i (.)}]
where Ci = [0, 1] for any i ∈ N . Note that for this game, the payoffs can be
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simply represented as follows:
c2 = 1 c2 ∈ [0, 1)
c1 = 1 2, 2 0, 3
c1 ∈ [0, 1) 3, 0 1, 1
We can calculate the best-response correspondences for Gf as bf1(c2) = [0, 1)
for any c2 ∈ [0, 1] and b
f
2(c1) = [0, 1) for any c1 ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly, the cost
profile (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium of the extended game Gf . In general, it is
true that any c ∈ [0, 1]2 is a Nash equilibrium of Gf if and only if c1 ∈ [0, 1)
and c2 ∈ [0, 1). 
Example 6 shows that the players that face a situation of Prisoners’
Dilemma (between cooperation and defection, say, in reporting that they
are guilty) when the game played is not mediated, remain to face a similar
dilemma (between cooperation and defection in reporting that their costs
of disobedience are not less than 1) also when their game is mediated if
they non-cooperatively select the penalty fees they commit to pay in case
they disobey the mediator’s recommendations. Interestingly, any cost profile
c ∈ [0, 1]2 that is arbitrarily close to, but smaller than, (1, 1) is a Nash equi-
librium of the cost selection game in Example 6, while it yields a payoff of 1 to
each player. On the other hand, each player could obtain a payoff of 2 if the
mediator were to interfere and slightly increase the cost of disobedience for
each player to a level equal to 1. It seems that the discontinuities in the value
of mediation and the value of enforcement at the cost level (1, 1) –that we
already calculated for the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game in Section 3.2– create a
strategic barrier for the players that cannot be overcome non-cooperatively.
Example 6 also suggests the following.
Remark 3. There exist cost-selection games where selecting the cost of dis-
obedience below some positive level, hence at zero level, is a weakly dominant
strategy for each player. In any Nash equilibrium of these games the payoff
of any player is equal to what s/he obtains when each player reports his/her
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cost of disobedience as zero.
The discontinuity of the expected utlity functions in Example 6 illustrates
that their continuity is, as already known, not essential but just sufficient for
the existence of a pre-strategy Nash equilibrium in Gf . As a matter of fact,
E[Ui|f(c)] is constant for each i ∈ N and higher in the own cost level ci
below the threshold of 1 (but constant and lower in the opponent’s cost level
cj below the same threshold). This makes zero cost profile weakly dominant.
However, if the players were to choose a cost level for their opponents (not
for themselves) non-cooperatively, then we would get zero cost profile strictly
dominated as in the previous example. Indeed, one may simply extend this
observation to predict that in dominance solvable games with a strictly domi-
nant strategy profile, in order to achieve efficiency, players should be enforced
to select the disobedience costs of their opponents. In this regard, Exam-
ples 5 and 6 together suggest that given any normal-form game a mediator
who has the capacity to calculate the expected utility of each player at all
admissible cost profiles can profitably investigate whether the socially effi-
cient outcome can be attained through a correlated equilibrium of a mediated
game when, prior to this game, the disobedience cost of each player will be
non-cooperatively selected by some player, not necessarily himself/herself.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have extended the notion of correlated equilibrium in
normal-form games to a notion of costly correlated equilibrium (CCE) by
allowing players to involuntarily or voluntarily bear a cost whenever they
disobey recommendations of the mediator. In case the cost of disobedience
is involuntary and common for all players, we have showed that the set of
CCE at any cost level expands (whenever there is a room for it) if and only if
the boundary of this set contains an unpure equilibrium, i.e., a non-vertex el-
ement of the probability simplex associated with the normal-form game. We
have also showed that if the payoffs of a normal-form game and the cost of
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disobedience are such that the total expected payoff of the players (the social
welfare) at an optimal CCE is lower than the maximal total expected payoff
they can ever get in the game, then the mediator can increase the social wel-
fare by raising the cost of disobedience to a sufficiently high level. We have
also discussed how our model can be extended, for a profitable investigation
by future research, to a setting where the cost of disobedience is strategically
chosen by each player. In more detail, we have considered a cost-selection
game (prior to every mediated normal-form game) in which each player non-
cooperatively chooses his/her cost after the mediator announces a CCE rule
that specifies an optimal CCE for each possible cost profile of the players.
We have showed that there exist cost-selection games in which choosing the
cost of disobedience at zero level (or below some positive level) is a strictly
dominated strategy for each player as well as games this strategy becomes
weakly dominant for each player.
Future research may also extend the notion of costly correlated equilib-
rium in a number of directions. For example, using the generalization of
correlated equilibrium by Hart and Schmeidler (1989) for infinite games, the
notion of CCE can be extended to any game with infinitely many strate-
gies. In particular, one can investigate the implication of disobedience costs
in potential games –a special class of infinite strategy games, introduced by
Monderer and Shapley (1994) and first studied within the context of corre-
lated equilibrium by Neyman (1997). Also, given the two well-known, and
generally unrelated, generalizations of correlated equilibrium in normal-form
games, namely the weak (coarse) correlated equilibrium (also known as the
simple extension) of Moulin and Vial (1978) and the soft correlated equilib-
rium of Forgo´ (2010), one can respectively define and study the weak costly
correlated equilibrium (WCCE) and the soft costly correlated equilibrium
(SCCE) taking the cost of disobedience into consideration. Another line
of research can integrate the cost of disobedience to a refinement of corre-
lated equilibrium known as “acceptable correlated equilibrium” introduced
by Myerson (1986) as the analogue of trembling-hand perfection.
Finally, one can experimentally investigate whether in mediated normal-
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form games the presence of a cost of disobedience for each player increases
the performance of the recommendations of the mediator in overcoming co-
ordination problems.
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